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Too Many Secrets? 
When Should the Intelligence Community be Allowed to Keep Secrets 
 
Abstract 
In recent years revelations regarding reports of torture by the CIA and the unnoticed growth of the NSA’s 
pervasive cyber-surveillance system have significantly brought into doubt the level of trust afforded to the 
intelligence community. Central to this is determining how much secrecy they should enjoy and what 
mechanisms should be employed to detect and prevent future abuse. This is not a call for complete 
transparency, however, as secret intelligence does play an important and ethical role in society. Rather, 
that existing systems built on a prioritisation of democratic assumptions are fundamentally ill-equipped 
for dealing with the particular challenge of intelligence secrecy. That, as the necessary ircle of secrecy is 
extended around the political actors they are insulated from the very public gaze that ensures they are 
working in-line with the political community’s best interests. Therefore, a new framework needs to be 
developed, one this paper will argue should be based on the just war tradition, where the principls of just 
cause, legitimate authority, last resort, proportionality and discrimination are able to alance the need to 
protect people while placing limits in terms of who can be harmed and to what degree. 
 
Key Words: Secrets, ethics, intelligence, just war 
 
Introduction 
The debate on state secrets is an ethically charged one from the outset. Revelations regarding reports of 
torture by the CIA and the unnoticed growth of the NSA’s pervasive cyber-surveillance system have 
significantly brought into doubt the level of trust afforded to the intellgence community. This paper is not 
a call for complete transparency, however, as this is both ethically problematic and inherently unworkable. 
Indeed, intelligence secrecy is a special type of state secrets, playing an important and ethical role in society 
by protecting both the individual and the political community, and without the ability to keep its tactics 
and the information it produces secret to some extent intelligence would be dramatically weakened. This 
means that ensuring a degree of secrecy is necessary. But this does not mean unrestr ined action, as without 
some supervision the powers of the intelligence community can cause unjustified harm. This paper will 
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argue, however, that the existing oversight structures, built on a prioritisation of democratic assumptions, 
are fundamentally ill-suited to the task. That, as the necessary circle of secrecy is extended around the 
political actors they are insulated from the very public gaze that ensures they are working in-line with the 
political community’s best interests. Furthermore, it will be argued that the security mentality that 
surrounds intelligence activity means that demands based on a need to prevent national security thr ats 
overrides any requirement for a more informed public. This mentality therefore distorts the debate and 
further undermines the oversight process. Therefore, a new framework needs to be developed, one this 
paper will argue should be based on the just war tradition. Indeed, the just war tradition is well versed in 
examining debates on security, balancing the necessity to protect the people and the harm that such 
activities can cause to both the individual and political community while placing limits in terms of who 
can be harmed and to what degree. After examining the shortcomings in the current theotical f undations 
and their problematic practical applications, this paper will establish an ethical framework based on the 
principles of last resort, legitimate authority, just cause, proportionality and discrimination offering a key 
original theoretical contribution to the field. Indeed, this paper will argue that protecting the political 
community and the individuals within it is the at heart of the principle of gitimate authority, and as the 
sphere of secrecy undermines and poisons existing democratic structures a new set of systems based on 
societal experts and representatives offers a means of better protecting the interests of the political 
community. This will work with the principle of last resort to place th emphasis on the intelligence 
community to present their case to this independent legitimate authority as to why the information should 
be retained, rather than outsiders asking for its release. Whereas the principle of just cause will recognise 
the importance of intelligence secret keeping to prevent threats from harming the political community as 
a form of pre-emptive self-defence, while also arguing that this does not mean focusing only on traditional 
conceptions of national security, but recognising that protecting the political community is more than just 
protecting the state and includes its ethical, moral, social and legal norms. This, in conjunction with the 
principle of proportionality, ensures that all the different conceptions of threat and harm are included in 
the ethical calculation. Finally, the principle of discrimination will argue, first, that different groups of
individuals have various claims to be informed depending on the type of information retained and how 
they were involved or impacted, and second, will work with the principle of last resort to argue that those 
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individuals who are unaware of their involvement in an intelligence operation should be actively sought 
out and informed.   
Advancing a framework based on the just war tradition in this way will allow for the development 
of an evaluative framework that can understand the ethical role secrecy can play while also setting out 
limits on when it should be used, the level of harm allowed and the different obligations it has to various 
individuals. This will be applied to a series of key examples covering operational and strategic intelligence 
asking if, what and when information should be released. 
 
Secrecy, Democracy, and Intelligence  
When examining the topic of state secrecy three questions are raised: why should we have transparency or 
be allowed to keep secrets; what secrets should be kept and what information should be released; and how 
do we go about ensuring that the correct information is revealed or locked away. The first two questions 
ask us to determine what normative basis we should be guided by, while the last points oward  what 
institutional mechanisms these normative assumptions then create. However, while there is strong work 
on the normative value of secrecy most broadly,1 works that specifically question its place within 
government activity have been dominated by debates on the importance of transparency and democracy.2 
For intelligence oversight this is even more pronounced with much of the literature examining and working 
within existing democratic assumptions and the frameworks they create, asking how different branches of 
government are suited for the task of monitoring the intelligence community’s extraordinary range of 
powers and extraordinary level of secrecy.3 This is not surprising given that much of democratic theory’s 
                                                 
1 Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (New York: Vintage Books, 1989); Georg Simmel, ‘The Sociology of Secrecy 
and of Secret Societies’ The American Journal of Sociology 11/4 (1906): 441-98; Stanton Tefft, Secrecy, a Crosscultural Perspective (New York: 
Human Sciences Press, 1980). 
2 This is Susan Maret’s general argument, see Susan Maret, ‘Introduction: Government Secrecy’ in Government Secrecy (Research in Social 
Problems and Public Policy, Volume 19) edited by Susan M ret (Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2011): xi. For government secrecy generally 
see Simone Chambers, ‘Behind Closed Doors: Publicity, Secrecy, and the Quality of Deliberation’ The Journal of Political Philosophy 12/4 
(2004): 389-410; Ian Shapiro, The Moral Foundations f Politics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003); Dennis F. Thompson, 
‘Democratic Secrecy’ Political Science Quarterly 114/2 (1999): 181-193; David E. Pozen, ‘Deep Secrecy’ Stanford Law Review 62/2 (2010): 
257-340; Jennifer Earl, ‘Information access and protest policing post-9/11: Studying the policing of the 2004 Republican National Convention’ 
American Behavioral Scientist 53 (2009): 44–60; Itzhak Galnoor, ‘What Do We Know About Government Secrecy’ in Government Secrecy in 
Democracies, edited by Itzhak Galnoor (New York: New York University Press, 1977): 275–313; J. Fulbright, ‘The High Cost of Secrecy’ The 
Progressive, 35/9 (1971): 16–21.  
3 For works not discussed directly elsewhere see Simon Chesterman, One Nation Under Surveillance: A New Social Contract to Defend Freedom 
Without Sacrificing Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); J. William Leonard, ‘The Corrupting Influence of Secrecy on National 
Policy Decisions’ Government Secrecy (Research in Social Problems and Public Policy, Volume 19) edited by Susan Maret (Emerald Group 
Publishing Limited, 2011): 421-434; Fred Schreier, ‘The Need for Efficient and Legitimate Intelligence’, in Democratic Control of Intelligence 
Services: Containing Rogue Elephants edited by Hans Born and Marina Caparini (London: Routledge, 2016): 25-44, at 36, 37; Marina Caparini, 
‘Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Services in Democratic States’, in Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue 
Elephants edited by Hans Born and Marina Caparini (London: Routledge, 2016): 3-24; Zachary K. Goldman and Samuel J. Rascoff, Global 
Intelligence Oversight: Governing Security in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Hans Born and Ian Leigh, 
Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards andBest Practice for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies (O lo: Parliament of Norway, 2005): 
55-59; Hans Born, Loch Johnson, and Ian Leigh, Who's Watching the Spies (editors) (Washington: Potomac Books Inc, 2005). 
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intellectual history has engaged heavily with the question of what role secrecy should or should not have 
as well as designing systems to prevent the harmful effects of state activity. So, while there are important 
utilitarian arguments made on the instrumental harms of secrecy and the good offere by transparency – 
dating back to Jeremy Bentham,4 arguing that openness provides better policies and social norms through 
a more engaged and reflective process – many of these have become synonymous with the good found 
within an engaged and deliberative democratic process as a whole.5 Indeed, from classical liberals such as 
John Stuart Mill and John Locke arguing that oversight is a fundamental part of a meaningful representative 
body;6 through to John Rawls placing transparency as a key means of ensuring a just society a  well as a 
means to monitor established institutions,7 to contractarians arguing the need for governments to give 
account and justify decisions to the community,8 here is an entrenched heritage arguing for the need for 
transparency in a democracy. Key amongst such arguments is the position that ‘The public, as sovereign, 
must have all information available in order to instruct its servants, the government. As a general 
proposition, if democracy is to work, there can be no holding back of information; o herwise ultimate 
decision making by the people, to whom that function is committed, becomes impossible’.9 Secrecy limits 
access to information and in doing so undermines the people’s role as the sovereign power; the Madisonian 
argument that ‘meaningful participation in democratic processes requires informed participants. Secrecy 
reduces the information available to the citizenry, hobbling their ability to participate meaningfully’.10 
Secrecy is therefore considered wrong in as much as it challenges democracy by delaying its processes, 
limiting engagement, or weakening an individual’s role. Furthermore, there is a recognition that 
government decision-makers, like all humans, are fallible. For this reason, public scrutiny is the most 
effective check on individual shortcomings, a point made by Mill: ‘The only stimulus which can keep the 
ability of the body itself up to a high standard is liability to the watchful criticism of equal ability outside 
the body’.11 Indeed Daniel Kono argues that because ‘democratic governments will emphasise policy 
                                                 
4 See Jeremy Bentham, Political Tactics, edited by Michael James, Cyprian Blamires, and Catherine Pease-Watkin (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1999): 29-44 
5 Mark Fenster, ‘The Opacity of Transparency’ Iowa Law Review 91 (2006): 885-949.  
6 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (London: Parker, Son, and Bourn, 1861): 104; for a discussion on transparency 
in Locke’s work see Ajume H. Wingo, Veil Politics in Liberal Democratic States (Cambridge, Cambridge Univeristy Press): 16-18. 
7 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971): 16, 454; John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1993): 35, 68. 
8 Amy Guttman and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Harvard University Press, 1996): 100-01; Joshua Cohen, ‘Democracy and 
Liberty’, in Deliberative Democracy edited by Jon Elster (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998): 185-231, at 185, 193-94. 
9 Thomas Emerson, ‘The First Amendment and the Right to Know: Legal foundations of the Right to Know’, Washington University Law 
Quarterly, 1 (1976): 14. 
10 Joseph Stiglitz, ‘On Liberty, the Right to Know, and Public Discourse: The Role of Transparency in Public Life’ in Globalising Rights: Oxford 
Amnesty Lecture 1999 (1999): 125. Emphasis in original.  
11 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (New York, Cosimo, 2005): 138. 
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decisions that please voters while hiding those which go against the will of the majority’ greater 
transparency is needed to ensure participation is based on correct information.12 The ormative value found 
within transparency over secrecy according to democratic theory, therefore, is enabling engaged 
sovereignty and preventing abuse of authority. 
From answering this first question democratic theory places a dominant emphasis on engaged 
transparency in determining what should be kept secret: instilling an open framework so that all decisions 
can be made in-line with the beliefs and values of the community served, underpin ing the importance of 
popular sovereignty: ‘an action or policy that cannot withstand publicity is one that cannot garner popular 
consent, and that is why the action is wrong’.13 Where transparency cannot be guaranteed then decision-
makers should act as if it could be. This promotes the publicity principle, Kant’s argument that the first 
test for a political maxim is to ask oneself ‘could I still get away with this if my action and reason for doing 
it were publically known?’.14 Indeed, Simone Chambers argues, ‘All theories of deliberative democracy 
contain something that could be called a publicity principle’, whereby determining what secrets should be 
kept involves ‘having to defend one’s policy preferences in public’ so that the decision ‘leans one towards 
using public reason’ or ‘reasons that this public at large could accept’.15 Such a principle ‘encourages 
participants to examine their own beliefs and arguments’, promoting critical self-reflection within 
decision-makers, while also conferring legitimacy as the policy ‘ought be to in the general interest’.16 For 
Jon Elster and Joshua Cohen this will therefore limit the private reason of individual maximisers; while 
Rawls and Seyla Benhabib are concerned, for very different reasons, about ‘the private reason of particular 
moral, religious, or cultural world-views’.17 This, therefore, supports social virtues such as freedoms of 
speech, assembly and press18 with value stated in terms of instrumental procedural benefits or the 
promotion of social goods such as liberty, morality, or equality.19 Arguments for the benefits of secrecy in 
                                                 
12 Daniel Kono, ‘Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency’, American Political Science Review 100 (2006): 369–384 
13 David Luban, ‘The Publicity Principle’ in The Theory of Institutional Design edited by Robert E. Goodin (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998): 192 
14 David Luban, ‘The Publicity Principle’ (1998): 156 
15 Simone Chambers, ‘Behind Closed Doors: Publicity, Secrecy, and the Quality of Deliberation’ The Journal of Political Philosophy 12/4 (2004): 
390 
16 Simone Chambers ‘Behind Closed Doors’ (2004): 390 
17 Simone Chambers ‘Behind Closed Doors’ (2004): 392 
18 Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Oppositin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971) 
19 J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1956). For instrumental arguments see John Stuart Mill, 
1861, Considerations on Representative Government (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1991): 74; J. Elster, ‘The Market and the Forum: Three 
Varieties of Political Theory’ in Philosophy and Democracy, ed. T. Christiano, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002): 152; and Amartya Sen, 
Development as Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1999): 152. For non-instrumental see Carol Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social 
Cooperation in Politics, Economics and Society (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988): 45-85; Joshua Cohen, ‘Procedure and Substance 
in Deliberative Democracy’ in Philosophy and Democracy, ed. T. Christiano, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002): 17-38, at 21; Peter Singer, 
Democracy and Disobedience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973): 30-41; J. Waldron Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999); and T. Christiano, ‘The Authority of Democracy’ Journal of Political Philosophy, 12/3 (2004): 266-290. 
19 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (1999): 152. 
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a democracy are possible but limited to instances of aiding in processes and furthering i s own democratic 
ends: ‘Juries and judicial panels, subcommittees and caucus meetings, peace negotiations and trade 
agreements, constitution writing and rights statements, not to mention hiring and admission committees, 
are just a few examples of where we might think it appropriate to close the doors and exclude the public’.20 
However, while this work on democracy is incredibly strong it can be problematic when examined in 
relation to intelligence. Firstly, in answering why we should (not) keep secrets, th  ethical end for 
intelligence is to protect the political community from threats, not to aid in the democratic agenda.21 The 
good found within secret intelligence is not that it aids the democratic process but i  the degree it acts as a 
direct positive in providing for the security of the political community by locating and preventing the 
realisation of threats. While the harm with keeping secrets is not the limitation it has on public engagement 
per se, but the impact it has directly on people’s autonomy as well as the additional harms too much secrecy 
can promote. Autonomy is the ability to decide for oneself, without external manipulation or interference, 
what shape one’s own life will take; that is, ‘being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in 
critical reflection about the planning of one’s life – the protection of the liberty of conscience’.22 This 
autonomy requires that the individual’s rational functioning be protected, maintaining the capacity to plan, 
choose, and reflect on options.23 To be able to act according to their own reasoning all the way down.24 
This includes how people decide how they should act in regards to their important relationship with their 
polis. However, withholding information means people are unable to make a fully informed rational 
decision, forced to act based on the will of those withholding the necessary information. With intelligence 
secret keeping the distortion is both general in that the whole community is unable to decide how to make 
decisions in regards to its own intelligence actors, and specific in that those individuals who are 
unknowingly targeted or impacted are unable to decide how they specifically should react. Secondly, there 
are additional harms caused when secret organisations create insular environments, separated from review, 
which can cause an escalation of policies that violates people’s lib rty, privacy or physical and mental 
                                                 
20 Simone Chambers, ‘Behind Closed Doors’ (2004): 392. Also see Mark Chinen, ‘Secrecy and Democratic Decisions’ Quinnipiac Law Review 
27/1 (2009): 1-53, at  9. 
21 While arguments have been made that ‘a democracy could decide to accept the possibility of incompletely-considered decisions now in the 
hopes of a better, and this in some sense freer and more meaningful decision, later’ (Chinen, Secrecy and Democratic Decisions (2009): 10) and 
that ‘If the public has voted to install any particular regime of secrecy, and thereby authorized certain officials to keep certain types of secrets in 
certain ways, those officials can be said to be carrying out their popular mandate when they do so’. David E. Pozen, ‘Deep Secrecy’ Stanford Law 
Review 62/2 (2010): 257-340, at 287. Critiques in terms of informed consent would undermine such arguments in a way that they would not in 
terms to the justification of intelligence for national security. 
22 Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 79. 
23 Harry Frankfurt, 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person', Journal of Philosophy, 68/1 (1971) p.7. 
24 Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgement (Harvard University Press, 1996): 228 
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integrity. This places the harm associated with keeping secrets in terms of the degree to which it violates 
the individual’s sovereignty and damages their most vital interests.25 Indeed, overly secretive environments 
separate those on the outside who are unaware and unable to engage, from those on the inside who are 
subjected to a process of in-group/out-group differentiation that dehumanises others and when coupled 
with a lack of outside input there is no differential means of measuring one’s moral compass.26 As a result, 
officers learn to exclude those considered as outsiders from their universe of obligati n.27 Cognitive 
restructuring means violence or harm is redefined as honourable, for a greater abstract good, and becomes 
increasingly socially and morally acceptable to those inside.28 S cretive environments normalise the in-
group/out-group differentiation  process, feeding upon itself to reinforce both the need for greater secrecy 
and a lack of regard for the negative consequences for those on the outside. In such an environment, internal 
criticism is limited as it is seen as a betrayal to the group, restricting alternative analysis as group-mentality 
smothers dissenting points of view.29  
This is especially problematic in regards to intelligence as the perceived pressure of the security 
environment shapes the internal culture of an organisation as well as those oversight actors who are drawn 
into the special sphere of secrecy. This means that intelligence secrecy needs to b  examined as a social 
and cultural problem so as to better understand Weber’s impersonal and rational bureaucracy.30 Indeed, 
the power of the security mind-set is such that when the answer to the question, ‘why is transparency 
important’ is a ‘more informed public’ and the answer to ‘why intelligence should be allowed to keep 
secrets’ is ‘the protection of national security’, then the latter is often given primacy. As a key example of 
securitisation, intelligence is still seen as quintessentially a topic f r realpolitik,31 and as a result is raised 
                                                 
25 ‘Feinberg calls these requirements ‘welfare interests’ and John Rawls calls them ‘primary goods’, but essentially they both amount to the same 
thing, that is, regardless of what conception of the good life the individual holds or what his life plans might be in detail, these preconditions 
must be satisfied first in order to achieve them. Joel Feinberg, Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Vol.1 Harm to Others (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1984): 37; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971): 62. 
26 Albert Bandura, ‘Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities’ Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3/3 (1999): 1 3-209, 
at 194. 
27 Helen Fein, Human Rights and Wrongs: Slavery, Terror and Genocide (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2007): 11 
28 Albert Bandura, Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1986): 376. Also 
see Leynes et al. ‘Emotional Prejudice, Essentialism, and Nationalism’, European Journal of Social Psychology 33/6  (2003): 703-717; Brian 
Mullen, Rupert Brown, and Colleen Smith, ‘In-group Bias as a Function of Salience, Relevance, and Status: An Integration’, European Journal 
of Social Psychology 22 (1992): 103-122; Naomi Struch, and Shalom Schwartz, ‘Intergroup Aggression: Its Predictors and Distinctness From In-
Group Bias’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 56/3 (1989): 364-373; R. Johnson, ‘Institutions and the Promotion of Violence’ in 
Anne Campell and John Gibbs (eds) Violent Transactions: The Limits of Personality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); James Waller, 
Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Philip Zimbardo, The Lucifer 
Effect: How Good People Turn Bad (London: Rider, 2008). 
29 US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Committee S udy of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (2014) 
Available at http://fas.org/irp/congress/2014_rpt/ssci-rdi.pdf [Accessed 1 February 2015]: 2. 
30 Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in sociology Edited and Translated by H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1946, 1958). Also see Susan Maret ‘Introduction: Government Secrecy’ in Government Secrecy (Research in Social Problems and Public Policy, 
Volume 19) edited by Susan Maret (Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2011): xi-xxx 
31 Michael Quinlan, ‘Just Intelligence: Prolegomena to an Ethical Theory’ Intelligence and National Security, 22/1 (2007): 1-13, at 1. Despite the 
growth of critical security schools of thought post-Cold War and their general success at raising the need for a wider conception of subject topic 
to include issues such as identity, health, environment, as well as new referent objects to include the individual, society or even the planet, when 
it comes to the issue of intelligence no significant change has been achieved. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde, Security: A New 
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out of the political realm and placed in the extraordinary security sphere where normal p litical rules and 
concerns are not given the same consideration and weight. The tension created is such that, as Dennis 
Thompson notes, you are essentially left with two options, ‘abandon the [security] policy or sacrifice 
democratic accountability’;32 and importantly a decision where national security is the trump card. As Eric 
Posner and Adrian Vermeule argue, there is a natural trade-off between civil liberties and security and that 
‘governments do – and should’ make the trade to ‘reduce civil liberties in order to enhance security’ in 
times of emergency.33 Security generally, and intelligence specifically, however, comes with a culture of 
constant emergencies, one that emerged throughout the Cold War and has continued under the War on 
Terror, reflecting a resurgence in Lasswell’s ‘garrison state’ and the prioritisation of a security mind-set 
that privileges a militaristic culture and policy imperatives over other concerns.34 This is matched by Cass 
Sustein’s growth in a risk culture, distorting how threats such as terrorism are perceived, overemphasising 
their importance and degree of the threat, promoting fear and social decohesion with n society while 
driving an escalation of security policy.35 Such mentality means that the publicity principle can have 
limited use as it is not incongruous to believe one is doing what is best for the political community by 
adhering to the needs of national security. As David Luban notes, the restrictions of the publicity principle 
are subject to ‘self-deception’ as ‘decision makers will undoubtedly persuade themselves that their 
subjective motivations are unimpeachable’.36 Those within the intelligence community and their 
authorising political actors are not necessarily acting according to some private or nefarious agenda. But 
rather the insular atmosphere has skewed their evaluation. Indeed, intelligence professionals are not bad 
people, but as Hannah Arendt highlighted, the mandate to try and protect the political community from 
threats and to seek to fulfil that objective actually encourages them to move further from that ethical end.37  
                                                 
Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Christopher Browning and Matt McDonald, ‘The Future of Critical Security Studies: 
Ethics and the Politics of Security’ European Journal of International Relations (2011): 1-21; Peter Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National 
Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press). 
32 Dennis Thompson, ‘Democratic Secrecy’ Political Science Quarterly, 114/2 (1999) 181-193, at 182. 
33 Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the Courts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 5.  
34 The topic of militarisation of political systems has been gaining momentum. The literature has built on Harold Lasswell’s ‘garrison state’, 
referring to the increasing focus and prioritisation of security and a security mind-set over any other concerns. Harold Lasswell, ‘The Garrison 
State’ The American Journal of Sociology, 46 (1941): 455-468; Harold Lasswell, ‘The Garrison-State Hypothesis Today’ Changing Patterns of 
Military Politics edited by Samuel Huntington (New York: Free Press, 1962): 51-70. See Debora Cowen and Emily Gilbert, (Editors). War, 
Citizenship, Territory (New York and London: Routledge, 2008); Cynthia Enloe Globalization And Militarism: Feminists Make the Link (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2007); Andrew Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced By War (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005); Robert Kagan, Dangerous Nation: America's Foreign Policy From Its Earliest Days To TheDawn Of The Twentieth 
Century (New York: Vintage Books, 2006). 
35 Cass Sustein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
36 David Luban, ‘The Publicity Principle’ in The Theory of Institutional Design edited by Robert E. Goodin (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press): 154-198, at 169.  
37 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Lond, Harcourt, Brace & World: 1979): 423.  
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This can distort intelligence policy application, promoting distrust not only between individuals and 
the state but also between different social groups, having real repercussions for individuals in terms of 
social mobility and treatment.38 In terms of intelligence this can result in tactics far harsher than was 
originally planned, including escalating interrogation techniques, increasingly itrusive collection 
methods, or unequal treatment based on race or ethnicity. Democratic theory offers no direct intellectual 
means of guiding how decision makers should balance the concerns of security over the threat that 
intelligence generally, or intelligence secrecy specifically, represents; it informs little on what goods and 
harms should be involved in the moral calculation; and it fails to combat the powerof th  national security 
mind-set. Therefore, if we are to better understand when secrets are best kept we need to meet ethical 
questions of national security on their own grounds; through a theoretical framework that is experienced 
in balancing and limiting the excesses of national security while still actng to protect the political 
community. 
Finally, the answer to the third question of how we go about monitoring secret keeping is directly 
shaped by the answers to the previous questions, and has thus proven particularly problematic in terms of 
intelligence. Indeed, there is what David Estlund calls a misplaced ‘modern enthusiasm for democracy’ 
whereby the assumption is that the structures or institutions will ‘promote justice or avoid horrors all by 
themselves, as if guided by an invisible hand’.39 By taking the answer to the first two questions as a given, 
liberal democracies utilise their executive, legislative and judiciary as the most appropriate set of structures 
to evaluate what secrets should be kept and when. Secondary actors are then used but are irectly 
answerable to one of the three government branches, predominantly the executive. For example, in the US 
this includes the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) that reviews documents for 
classification; the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) carries out investigations and 
initiates activities for the President; agency Inspector Generals who report to the Secretary of the 
department or the director of the agency it is responsible for; and other advisory commissions and advisory 
bodies such as the Office of Management and Budget which reviews spending, or the Department of 
                                                 
38 Spiros Simitis, ‘Reviewing Privacy in an Information Age’ University of Pennsylvania Law Review 35/3 (1987): 707-746, at 719; Robert Merton, 
Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1968): 477; David Harris, ‘Racial Profiling Revisited: ‘Just Common Sense’ in the 
Fight Against Terror?’ Criminal Justice 17 (2002): 36-59; David A. Harris, ‘Driving While Black and Other Traffic Offences: The Supreme Court 
and Pretextual Traffic Stops’ The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 87 (1999): 544-582;  Randall Kennedy, Race Crime and the Law
(New York: Patheon, 1997); Annabelle Lever, ‘Why Racial Profiling is Hard to Justify: A Response to Risse and Zeckhauser’ Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 33/1 (2005): 94-110; and Matthew Robinson, ‘The Construction and Reinforcement of the Myth of Race Crime’ Journal of 
Contemporary Criminal Justice 16 (2000): 133-156 
39 David Estlund, ‘The Democracy/Contractualism Analogy’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, 31/4, (2003): 387-412, at 387. 
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Defense’s own Intelligence Oversight Program whose object is to ensure operations meet statutory and 
constitutional rights of US persons. 
The nature of intelligence, however, makes these structures fundamentally unsuitable. This is initially 
because in order to ensure effective intelligence while also having some form of versight, those selected 
to keep watch must be allowed into the circle of secrecy in order to have access to th  relevant information. 
Extending this circle of secrecy means there is no one maintaining a watch on these oversight actors; they 
themselves are not being held to account and their decision-making is protected. The pressure on the 
elected officials to act accordingly is removed and other pressures – both personal and professional – are 
allowed to flourish. Offering secrecy to an oversight mechanism that relies on populous support allows 
them space to react according to personal biases or what would be reported as the popular choice. Indeed, 
as Kono has argued and demonstrated, electoral systems encourage governments to emphasise policy 
decisions that please voters while hiding those which go against the will ofthe majority placing pressure 
to select the correct message and limit contradicting information.40 This protection undermines the very 
purpose of a democracy by preventing public observation and scrutiny.   
Secondly, the use of checks and balances through the separation of powers and a differentiation of 
their mandate, does not work for intelligence.41 Intelligence is not positioned in opposition to these actors 
but is subsumed, if not hidden, within them. Compartmentalisation, unequal power and unequal access to 
information means that the legislative and judiciary are always at a disadvantage to the executiv . Indeed, 
in terms of critiques of how these structures act and interrelate there is an xtensive set of works. Prominent 
among them is Rahul Sagar’s Secrets and Leaks: The Dilemma of State Secrecy, offering a detaile  and 
systematic evaluation of each branch of government. His review includes arguments that ‘where the 
Congress is concerned, its structure and composition… make it prone to undisciplined disclosures’42 while 
also ‘Given the President’s stronghold over the flow of national security information, there is little reason 
to believe that lawmakers will be able to take the lead in uncovering policies and actions’.43 Whereas in 
terms of the judiciary he argues that ‘judges are not trained, and the courts not equipped, to make politically 
                                                 
40 Daniel Kono, ‘Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency’ American Political Science Review, 100/3 (2006): 369–384. 
41 For the intellectual heritage of the importance of the separation of powers see James Madison, The Federalist No. 51: The Structure of the 
Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between Different Departments 1788 (New York: Dover Publications, INC: 2014); 
B. Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws 1748 (London: T. Evans: 1777); John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, P. Laslett, ed. (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press: 2004) 
42 Rahul Sagar, Secrets and Leaks: The Dilemma of Stateecrecy (Princeton University Press, 2016): 23. 
43 Rahul Sagar, Secrets and Leaks (2016): 128. Emphasis in the original. Also see Philip Fluri and Hans Born, Parliamentary Oversight of the 
Security Sector: Principles Mechanisms and Practices (DCAF, 2003): 22. 
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charged decisions about what state secrets are appropriate’ coupled with a ‘judicial deference towards the 
executive’s claims about the harm likely to be caused by the disclosures’.44 Kathleen Clark has also written 
extensively on the executive’s refusal to open intelligence oversight to external review and the failure of 
the legislative to act as a counter force. That despite President Obama’s promise of a ‘new era of openness’, 
there were ‘disappointments’ in his willingness to ‘hold accountable those involved in several controversial 
Bush administration intelligence programs’. This includes a critique of the ‘gang of eight’ system where 
legislative notification through the eight leading members of Congress – including leaders of both parties 
from the Senate and House of Representatives, and the chair and ranking members of both the Senate and 
House Committee for Intelligence – who, during the Bush administration’s use of warrantless surveillance, 
were silenced by executive instructions that no information was to be shared as it exerted its own authority 
to keep such information secret.45 William Weaver and Robert Pillitto argue that in the US ‘the executive 
branch over the last several decades have been emboldened to assert secrecy privileged because of judicial 
timidity and because of Congressional ineffectiveness’.46 Their conclusion is that ‘the privilege is 
invariably fatal to efforts to gain access to covered documents’; that the structures are insufficient to 
prevent abuse of the privilege as courts are unable to administer costs for miappropriate use; or because 
the intelligence services claim that small bits of information are part of a much bigger intelligence secret 
related to national security and the courts are unable and unwilling to supplant their und rstanding of 
national security over that of the intelligence and security infrastructu e.47 Moreover, in courts where the 
whole proceedings are kept secret – the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court being a notable case – 
secrecy limits opportunity for engaged reflection and debate on the legal interpretation as judicial peer 
review and the right to appeal is prevented.48 What this highlights is that these existing political structures 
lack the physical power to keep the intelligence community in check; are insufficient n manpower, 
                                                 
44 Rahul Sagar, Secrets and Leaks (2016): 74. 
45 Kathleen Clark, ‘“A New Era of Openness?” Disclosing Intelligence to Congress Under Obama’ Constitutional Commentary 26 (2010): 313-
337, at 315. Also see Kathleen Clark, ‘Congress’s Right to Counsel Intelligence Oversight’ University of Illinois Law Review, 2011/3 (2011): 915-
960; Kathleen Clark, ‘The Architecture of Accountability: A Case Study of the Warrantless Surveillance Program’ Brigham Young University 
Law Review 2010/2 (2010): 357-420. 
46 William Weaver and Robert Pallitto, ‘State Secrets and Executive Powers’ Political Science Quarterly 120/1 (2005): 85-112, at 86. 
47 William Weaver and Robert Pallitto, ‘State Secrets and Executive Powers’ (2005): 85-112, at 103-104. For more on the institutional arrangement 
and executive dominance of the classification system see Nathan Brooks, The Protection of Classified Information: The Legal Framework 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004): 2, n. 6; David Morrissey, Disclosure and Secrecy: Security Classification Executive 
Orders (Columbia: AEJMC, 1997): 35–7. On the relationship between the courts and other parts of government see Norman Dorsen and John H. 
F. Shattuck, ‘Executive Privilege, The Congress and the Courts’ Ohio State Law Journal 35/1 (1974): 1-40; Meredith Fuchs, ‘Judging Secrets: 
The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy’ Administrative Law Review 58/1 (2006): 131-176; Robert Deyling, ‘Judicial 
Deference and De Novo Review in Litigation over National Security Information under the Freedom of Information Act’ Villanova Law Review 
37/1 (1992): 67-112. 
48 For the role of the right to appeal and the importance of multi-layered court systems see Harlon Leigh Dalton, ‘Taking the Right to Appeal 
(More or Less) Seriously’ Yale Law Journal 95/1 (1985): 62-107; Thomas Lennerfors, ‘The Transformation of Transparency: On the Act on Public 
Procurement and the Right to Appeal in the Context of the War on Corruption’ Journal of Business Ethics, 73/4 (2007): 381-390; Richard Nobles 
and David Schiff, ‘The Right to Appeal and Workable Systems of Justice’ The Modern Law Review 65/5 (2002): 676-701. 
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intellectual mandate or drive to do so; or cannot separate their own political in erests from their role as 
overseer. 
A third problem is that the system is overall too passive. In a system of checks and balances there has 
developed an ethos of authorising or rejecting the activity at the point of asking for permission or at 
established times. For example, the legislative’s power over the intelligence community is mainly limited 
to the power of the purse or carrying out investigations after the scandal has been revealed.49 Or in terms 
of the executive or judiciary, intelligence actors are meant to approach them for authorisation, with 
surveillance warrant requests being the most notable example of this.50 T i  has, however, proven highly 
problematic because it is wholly too passive for the intelligence community and its i herently closed-off 
nature. Waiting for intelligence actors to bring issues for authorisation means that there is virtually no 
investigation into what they are doing otherwise, meaning that too much power rests with them to decide 
what, if and when to bring it forward.  
Finally, these transparency mechanisms have inherent asymmetries of power in the wrong direction. 
That is, intelligence agencies, or the executive who acts on their behalf, has all the information to make 
their case while other oversight actors – the legislative or individual for instance – have very little or no 
information. Individuals making Freedom of Information (FoI) requests, for example, are at a significant 
disadvantage in regards to knowing when to ask, what to ask and how to appeal a decision. This means the 
emphasis is the wrong way around. The state has the knowledge and the power, while those making the 
request have none.  
Therefore, it is not surprising that historically and contemporarily intellgence practice has been stalked 
by both an overreach of the intelligence community and a lack of intervention by the existing oversight 
apparatus. Watergate was an intelligence scandal that resulted from President Nixon abusing his powerto 
not only attempt to gain advantage over his political rivals but then to cover up his involvement.51 While 
the NSA surveillance techniques exposed by Edward Snowden demonstrated the limited review growing 
intelligence practices were subjected to.52 Or, as detailed by the Senate in 2015, the use of torture by the 
                                                 
49 Daniel Baldino, Democratic Oversight of Intelligenc Services (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2010): 62. 
50 Wiretaps in United Kingdom require a warrant that must be authorized by the Secretary of State, see Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
2000 Chapter 23, Part 1, Chapter 1, x6(1). In the USA wiretaps must be authorized by a three judge panel whose sole purpose is to review 
applications for electronic surveillance warrants. See The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1978 ‘Electronic Surveillance Within the United 
States for Foreign Intelligence Purposes’, x101–105. 
51 Church Committee Final Report Book 1 (1975) Available at http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/contents/church/contents_church_reports.htm 
[Accessed 4th September 2015]: 344 
52 Dan Roberts, ‘Patriot Act author prepares bill to put NSA bulk collection “out of business”’ The Guardian, 10 October 2013. Available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill [Accessed 20 September 2015]. 
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CIA had been exacerbated by senior political actors – including National Security Advisor Condoleezza 
Rice, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell – failing to either 
investigate properly what was going on or to act on what they knew.53 What these examples show is that 
the abuse of intelligence powers is not limited to that of just the intelligence community itself, but to 
political elites that are either the source of the abuse or fail to sufficiently investigate and report on 
intelligence activity.  
 
The Just War Solution 
The current system, therefore, has become beset with some key problems: an ethos of passivity; a structural 
asymmetry of power; emphasis on the importance of the political community over the individual; and 
organisational impotence.54 What is needed is a reimagining of the theoretical foundation, bringing in one 
that is well versed in dealing with the types of debates had at the security level, balancing the needs of 
protecting the state against the harms that pursuing those ends can cause. To this end this paper will argue 
that the just war tradition and its principles of last resort, legitimate authority, just cause, proportionality 
and discrimination can offer some interesting contributions to the discussion. This framework will aid by 
providing a better guiding light for those who are to make the decisions by highlighting what factors must 
be included while also providing new ideas as to what structures can be developed to actualise these 
criteria. 
As a broad body of thought the just war tradition ‘remains one of the most popular frameworks 
for evaluating the morality of war and warfare’;55 influencing and becoming reflected in political rhetoric 
and legal cannon.56 At its core is the argument that there are some acts (namely killing) that ‘in the normal 
context are gravely wrong’ but cannot be totally ‘dismissed by pacifist anathema’57 as the state must be 
able to act to safeguard those it is charged with protecting. This does not mean allowing unrestrained action 
as the just war tradition acts as both a limiting and licensing ethical framework. It seeks to limit when the 
                                                 
53 Ross W. Bellaby, ‘An INS Special Forum: The US Senate Select Committee Report on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program’ 
Intelligence and National Security 31/1 (2016): 8-27, at 13. 
54 Robert Chesney, ‘State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation’ George Washington Law Review, 75/5 (2007): 1249-1332; Kristen 
Uhl, ‘The Freedom of Information Act Post 9/11: Balancing the Public Right to Know, Critical Infrastructure Protecting, and Homeland Security’ 
American University Law Review, 53/1 (2003): 261-3 1; Christina Wells, ‘National Security and the Freedom of Information Act’ Administrative 
Law Review, 56/4 (2004): 1195-1222 
55 Scott Fitzsimmons, ‘Just War Theory and Private Security Companies’ International Affairs 91/5 (2015): 1069-1084, at 1069. For a summary 
of the various different historical thematic and contemporary intellectual developments see James Turner Johnson, ‘The Just War Idea: The State 
of the Question’ Social Philosophy and Policy 23/1 (2006): 167-195. 
56 For political use see John Kelsay, ‘Just War Thinking as Social Practice’ Ethics and International Affairs 27/1 (2013): 67-86. For the principle 
of discrimination see, Article 48, first additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions; for the principle of proportionality see Article 51(4b), 
first additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions; for the principle of just cause see Article 51 UN Charter.  
57 Michael Quinlan, ‘Just Intelligence: Prolegomena to an Ethical Theory’ (2007): 1-13, at 1.  
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harms of war can be deployed, allowing them to protect the political community from harm, but again 
limiting what sort of actions can be performed in pursuing this objective.58 From this basis theorists have 
adapted the just war tradition to tackle emerging ethical-security problems of the day, from acts of 
terrorism and counterterrorism policy,59 drone warfare,60 biosecurity,61 private military companies,62 and 
civil wars.63 Most related to the questions examined here is the turn towards the applying the justwar 
tradition to intelligence use. Michael Quinlan and Ross Bellaby, for example, each argue that there are 
important analogies between the conduct of war and the use of intelligence that make he transference of 
the framework possible.64 That is, on the one hand intelligence inherently involves violating people’s vital 
interests: ‘Effective espionage requires intelligence officers to deceive, incite, and coerce in ways not 
acceptable for members of the general public’;65 ‘intelligence carries an ethical baggage with it or – to be 
more accurate – a baggage of unworthiness’.66 But on the other hand the harm caused can be justified when 
these acts are used for protecting the political community from a variety of threats, though there are still 
limits needed to ensure the method used is justified given the surrounding circumstances.  
But how does this help understand questions of state secrets and what ethical framework it is likely 
to create. Firstly, on a theoretical level the just war tradition gives an important starting point in the need 
to understand the fundamental harm caused to the individual – that is, the impact it has on our most 
fundamental vital interest – and how this relates to the harm that the national security agenda is seeking 
to prevent. Just as the just war tradition recognises a general presumption against killing to be justified 
                                                 
58 James Turner Johnson, ‘Contemporary Just War Thinking: Which Is Worse, to Have Friends or Critics?’ Ethics and International Affairs 27/1 
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and Order: The Shared Logics of Realism and Just War Theory’ International Studies Quarterly 59 (2015): 11-22.  
59 Scott Lowe, ‘Terrorism and the Just War Theory’ Perspective on Evil and Human Wickedness 1/2 (2003): 46-52; Michael Walzer, ‘Terrorism 
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Theory and the Privatisation of Military Force’ Ethics and International Affairs 22/2 (2008): 143-162. 
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International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18/3 (2005): 398-434; Kevin Macnish, ‘Just Surveillance? Towards a Normative 
Theory of Surveillance’ Surveillance & Society 12/1 (2014): 142-153; David Omand and Mark Phythian, ‘Ethics and Intelligence: A Debate’ 
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 26/1 (2013): 38-63; David Omand, ‘The Dilemmas of Using Secret Intelligence for 
Public Security’ in New Protective State: Government, Intelligence and Terrorism edited by Peter Hennessy (London: Continuum, 2007): 142–
169, at 157.   
65 Tony Pfaff and Jeffery Tiel, ‘The Ethics of Espionage’ Journal of Military Ethics 3/1 (2004): 1-15, at 1. 
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within a set of given limits, the impacts of secret keeping on people’s autonomy and other vital interests 
means there is also a general presumption against secrecy unless a direct justification s given.67 The 
tradition then breaks down the justification into a set of ethical sub-questions and debates to be had that, 
in combination, provide an extensive understanding as to whether the act is just or not. These criteria are 
well versed in dealing with the types of ethical debates that are raised in the security sphere, drawing on 
both absolutist as well as utilitarian questions and concerns. For example, the principle of just cause asks 
us to consider the underlying reason given for why the harm is justified, drawing on wider ethical 
arguments on self-defence, the duty of the state to protect the political community and even the right to 
punish, explored through hypotheticals and real life and historical cases to understand what reasons are 
justifiable for different acts.68 For intelligence secrets the just cause therefore directs us to evaluate what 
threats we are likely to face if the information is known and the veracity of those threats. The principle of 
legitimate authority places the political community at the centre, allowing for a move away from 
democratic structures and their necessary elected element. While the principle of proportionality delineates 
what costs and benefits should be included in the calculation and ensures that the overall ben fit is in the 
positive. Whereas the principle of discrimination seeks to distinguish the rights and obligations the state 
has to different groups of people, outlining who gets to know what and when. So not only does the just 
war tradition direct us to ask certain ethical questions that are relevant in the security world but it also 
establishes a body of thought to guide the types of debates we should be having, and the v riety of answers 
available to us.  
 
Types of Intelligence Secrets  
Depending on the type of intelligence information, the nature of the secret can change. Operational 
information, for example, refers to the ‘on-the-ground’ details about how operations are run and can 
include information on tactics used and the people involved. Recent revelations regarding undercover 
police operations and infiltration of domestic groups, such as trade unions, have raised questions about 
                                                 
67 Laurie Calhoun, ‘The Metaethical Paradox of Just War Theory’ Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4/1 (2001): 41-58. 
68 Some early revisionists relied heavily on highly artificial cases (e.g., McMahan 1994; Rodin 2002). They were criticized for this by 
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which organisations should be targeted and the recourse they should have in terms of knowing what was 
collected about them.69 One of the main problems at this level of analysis is that people will not know if 
they are connected to an infiltration operation, even tentatively; whether they are suspected, followed or 
investigated in some way; or whether their information is being stored on a database somewhere. 
Moreover, the current system offers no means of resolving this. The passive nature of the system, relying 
on individuals to inquire, coupled with an over-enthusiastic confidentiality system, mans that individuals 
can be involved in some operation without ever knowing about it.  
In comparison, while operational information is the on-the-ground details, strategic information can 
refer to embedded cultures, structures and policies. For example, the Edward Snowden’s disclosures 
confirmed that between ‘Prism’, ‘XKeyscore’ and ‘Enterprise Knowledge’, the NSA has been collecting 
and storing some two billion ‘record events’ per day since 2010, demonstrating that en masse surveillance 
had grown to become an established practice.70 So, leaving aside the question of whether Snowden was 
correct to release the information himself, there is a long-term, wide-ranging practice that needs to be 
determined about what can be revealed for an engaged evaluation.  
 
Last Resort  
The principle of last resort sets where the presumption towards secret keeping should lie. Traditionally the 
principle of last resort is an attempt to allow means that cause lower levels of harm, like diplomacy or 
economic pressure, a chance to resolve the threat before the higher harms of war are permitted. However, 
Robert Phillips warns that, ‘it is a mistake to suppose that ‘last’ necessarily designates the final move in a 
chronological series of actions’.71 There is no rigid methodology, beginning with the least harmful and 
ending in war, but it does require that some of the more harmful actions are not ‘jumped’ to out of ease, 
efficiency or expediency. That the emphasis should be to avoid harm if possible, while recognising when 
the lesser activities are inappropriate or redundant. 
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For the issue of secret keeping this seeks to redress the power imbalance and places a strong 
expectation not to retain information indiscriminately or out of habit, establi hing a presumption that 
information should be released unless there is a direct reason presented as to why it should be retained. 
This principle therefore gives a reorientation on the emphasis, away from the one of classification unless 
justified for release, to release unless a direct case can be made for retention. The burden must be placed 
on intelligence actors to justify why they wish the information to be withheld. Without a direct reason the 
information should be released. This is important as it contradicts what has been a growing tendency 
towards blanket classification procedures. For example, investigators in the 1970s found that over 90% of 
information in some departments were inappropriately classified, while following the 9/11 attacks the 
G.W. Bush administration ‘encouraged officials to withhold ‘sensitive but unclassified information’, 
which arguably should be disclosed [under the Freedom of Information Act]’ as well as lobbying the 
Homeland Security Act which specifically exempts ‘critical infrastructure information’ from disclosure. 
This included an expansion of what counted as ‘sensitive but unclassified’ information with officials 
estimating that ‘Nearly 75% of all government-held information is ‘sensitive but unclassified’’. In 2003, 
the Bush administration classified over 14 million documents, an increase of 14% on the previous year.72 
Likewise, in the UK the 20 Year Rule (which was the 30 Year Rule pre-2015) stated th t central 
government departments along with other public bodies are mandated to identify records of historical value 
by the time they are 20 years of age, illustrating the assumption both that it is left to the departments to 
decide what is sensitive information and that there is no check on the classification decision until much 
later on. This represents a blanket system that is unreflective and does not take into account the benefit of 
revealing the information at the time of publication.  
The principle of last resort therefore does some key things. First, it re-orientates the emphasis away 
from class-based exemptions and a situation where those on the outside must petition for information 
release, to a system where the intelligence community must argue for information retention. Second, it sets 
the bar higher than previously considered. This means that arguments for retention based on ‘mosaic 
theory’ – where disparate information sets are retained in case they combine to give significance at  later 
stage – would not be sufficient unless the intelligence community could make a compelling argument for 
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how information release would cause direct harm.73 Finally, this principle works with the later 
discrimination principle to argue that those who have been involved in an intelligence operation, 
unknowingly and without result, should be sought out and informed. In practice this would mean that 
operational and procedural examination by the independent board can be petitioned by th  intelligence 
community as to why the information should be kept secret against an advocate arguing for its release. 
Short of a compelling reason for why, as outlined by other just war criteria and the necessary level of 
evidence, the information will be released.  
 
Legitimate Authority  
In the just war tradition the principle of legitimate authority argues that in order for a war to be considered 
morally permissible it must be authorised by the right (or legitimate) authority. This authorising actor must 
have both the moral weight of representing and protecting the needs of the political community as well as 
ensuring practical considerations, such as having the physical, intellectual and emotional ability while 
limiting personal costs or bias: ‘since the care of the common weal is committed to those who are in the 
right authority, it is their business to watch over the common weal’.74 While traditionally legitimate 
authority is placed with the state and its representatives as the most appropriate actor to fulfil these needs, 
this does not necessarily have to be the case. The state will often represent a good choice as it has extensive 
experience and knowledge and in many instances is a manifestation of the political community. However, 
as Cecile Fabre argues, the rights and privileges that a state has is justif ied ‘only in so far as they thereby 
serve individuals’ fundamental interests’.75 At the heart of this is the understanding that the individual and 
their sovereignty is the fundamental ethical unit, and it is from here that the principle of legitimate authority 
draws its importance. So, when the state fails in this task or begins to represent the source of the problem 
then there is a need to rest the legitimate authority elsewhere. 
What this means for intelligence and secret keeping is that while established political leaders have 
been used as the main oversight actor because they represent the state in other areas, we can look beyo d 
these established institutions and create new ones that are more suited to preventing the special type of 
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harm that intelligence secret keeping can cause. As previously argued, the current extension of the sphere 
of secrecy over the existing frameworks has allowed the security mind-set to take primacy with no external 
viewer to limits its influence. This means the existing system is the source of the problem and so legitimate 
authority needs to be located elsewhere, in-line with the principles of the just war tradition.  
Since the authority should represent the political community it does not have to be limited to only 
state representatives nor do they necessarily have to be elected or subject to populous demands – as 
restricting it in this way can be more detrimental to the actual review. Therefore, alternative representative 
mechanisms can be utilised such as using legal, moral and societal experts, chosen because of their merit 
rather than because of their elected status, interrogated by the legislative in a public debate to test their 
suitability. To limit the distortive effect of political interference the body should be able to determine for 
itself what information should be released and to whom, free from censure. If it d tects intelligence activity 
that contravenes the principles outlined in the other criteria it should be free to determine for themselves 
what to reveal according to the interests of the community free from worries of political scandal.  
In order to ensure the organisation is suitably monitored – so that the watchers are watched – wider 
political community examination can be assured through regular reports on procedures, decision 
justifications and rates of classification, including statistics and summaries of ts own activities to the 
public free from editing so they can be reviewed by the public. It must detail what they have investigated, 
what they chose not to reveal, and when it should be looked at again to see if the reasoning made still 
stands. This is similar to David Pozen’s recommendation for ‘second order disclosure requirements’ to 
‘raise the level of generality’ in order to make the decision process ‘translucent’ while not making the 
secret transparent.76 Further, the justification given should be examined periodically to determine if th
reason still stands, where the time lapsed would depend on the reason given. For example, that the 
operation is still active is a strong justification for not releasing the information, but would need examining 
once the operation would have expected to have reasonably been finished. While justifications for 
maintaining secrecy regarding policies and practices could be set up to be reviewed at set intervals to 
ensure that the practice has not escalated beyond its original mandate. Sunset clauses for both the review 
of decisions and for membership will help avoid a stagnant mentality within the decision-making body. 
They themselves will then be held to account in a similar way to how a Supreme Justice in the US system 
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is reviewed, with relative ease to initiate an investigation but withincreasing difficult to successfully 
remove them. For example, the bar for legislative impeachment should start relatively ow, needing only 
a simple majority to start an investigation, but should require a two-third majority by both Houses to be 
successful. This should establish a significantly rigorous bar for their removal in order to protect them 
from political interference. 
The devil, however, is often in the detail of such arguments, and while it is not the aim of this paper 
to give organisational specifics but to highlight underlying principles, it i  possible to foresee a general 
shape around what a suitable structure might look like. For example, in order to achieve the penetration 
needed to overcome the passivity problem and carry out the level of review rquired the oversight actor 
could consist of a web of observers within each of the different levels of the intelligence community, with 
sets of individuals physically present at meetings, work-stations and within chain-of-commands who can 
collect and process the information for a board of governors who then determine what should be released, 
when and to whom. This web would be a parallel and integrated, but separate in terms of chain-of-
command. This is an extension and strengthening of the ‘police patrol’ model that is argued for, so that the 
oversight presence is felt throughout and through its surveillance misuse is discouraged.77 It limits the 
ability and opportunity to hide poor performance, while offering a point of contact for real-time 
clarification and authorisation. Indeed, one concern of political oversight is slow or lengthy chain-of-
commands that can be delayed by the alternative pressures and needs of the politician carrying out their 
other duties. Individuals within this web would be unknown to the wider world in order to protect them 
from counter-intelligence operations. However, they would report directly to a public board of governors 
who would decide what information should be revealed and when. In order to have a balance of expertise 
and representation the board’s composition can come with guaranteed number of places for legal, moral, 
intelligence and community leaders.78 By ensuring these different perspectives we can reproduce ‘as best 
we can, the critical function of pluralism within the deliberative body’ that will aid in ‘safeguarding against 
a particularist view’.79 None should be sitting elected officials who might feel external populous pressures. 
By giving the board of governors a new mandate to examine intelligence information in terms of the harm 
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caused, guided by the other just war criteria, free of the normal political pressures that elected politicians 
face, and one where its remit is to tackle national security concerns directly, a new culture can be 
developed.80 The diversification of membership will offer a suitable cross-representation of concerns held 
by the political community. In combination, this diversification along with a clearer mandate will further 
prevent the stagnation and insulation that was experienced by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
as examinations will be subject to a wider realm of peer review with concerns outside the direct legal 
interpretation being considered and incorporated.81  
 
Just Cause 
Often considered one of the core propositions of the just war tradition, the principle of just cause requires
and evaluates the central justifying reason for why the harm done is ethically necessary. Within the just 
war literature there is much debate as to what constitutes a just cause, with traditionalists focusing on self-
defence as the dominant justification for war, while revisionists such as Jeff McMahan argue for a more 
flexible interpretation where different kinds of wrongs can justify a comparable stat  response.82 What is 
important for intelligence and its secret keeping is that the ethical end is the protection of the political 
community and the individuals within it by detecting, locating and preventing threats. This means that the 
value of both secrecy and transparency is ensuring this end. Given that the presumption is against keeping 
secrets, in order for the intelligence community to justify information retention it must put forward an 
argument that secret keeping is an essential part of protecting people and that releasing the information 
would be harmful to them. In many ways, this supports the national security argument often made, 
revolving around the need to safeguard against threats from ‘espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the 
activities of agents of foreign powers and from actions intended to overthrow or undermi e parliamentary 
democracy by political, industrial or violent means’.83 However, protecting the political community is 
more than just protecting the state, and includes its ethical, moral, social and legal norms. Indeed, this was 
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the sentiment outlined in the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications 
Technologies, noting that while the word security often refers to national or homeland security it should 
include those ethical norms vital for ‘people to be secure in their persons’.84 The purpose of the just cause 
is not necessarily to balance these, but is to highlight what they are and interrogate them.85 Reconciling 
these different conceptions of security and determining if there is a suitable threat to k ep the information 
secret can be achieved by answering critical questions that include asking, first, whether releasing the 
information will cause a direct, foreseeable or immediate harm to come to the political community or 
individual. The answer to this then rests on some sub-questions regarding how realistic the threat is: who 
represents the source of the threat; what are the social, historical and cultural contexts to this supposed 
threat; how realistic is the threat given the current climate, abilities and opportunities; and how immediate 
is the threat.86 In contrast, it should also be asked to what extent the activity or information represents a 
threat to the individual or society’s ethical, social or political rights or norms. This can include questions 
on which rights are being violated; how severe is the violation; and whether the violation is accepted in 
some way.87 
In terms of operational information, the just cause is in determining the po ential harms for releasing 
and keeping the information so that they can then be balanced in the proportionality calculation. For 
example, when infiltrating another closed-off state or group, the use of a cover protects the operative’s 
safety as well as ensuring mission success. If it is clear that revealing the information would put operative 
lives in danger and there are no other harms foreseen to others by retaining the information then there is a 
just cause to keep the information secret. Gaining access to a terrorist grups, for instance, is a very 
‘complex and often dangerous’ operation with deadly results for the operative if things go wrong.88 In this 
instance, the potentially significant threat of harm to the operative means that there is a strong case for 
keeping the details secret. In comparison, infiltrating a peaceful organisation such as a trade union would 
not come with the same threat of violent repercussions. So, while in this instance the operative’s identity 
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might still be retained to prevent any personal backlash, the operation itself can be reveal d to those 
involved as there is not the same threat of repercussions.  
Whereas with strategic information the just cause is understanding the type of threat created when 
a policy is known and potentially undermined, against the harm that the policy itself can cause, incl ding 
the wider threat that such methods represent to the security of society and its ethical norms. For example, 
Andrew Parker, the Director General of the UK Security Service, has argued that the Snowden revelations 
have resulted in a ‘guidebook for terrorists’ that represents a ‘gift if they need to evade us and strike at 
will’.89 Equally, Sir John Sawers, Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) Chief, said that terroris s would 
be ‘rubbing their hands with glee’ at the level of information that had been put in the public domain by the 
Snowden leaks.90 However, the argument that such awareness fundamentally undermines intelligence 
practices has little evidence. One senior intelligence officer argued that, ‘The problem for Al Qaeda is they 
cannot function without cellphones… You can’t run a sophisticated organisation without communications 
in this world. They know all this, but to operate they have to go on’.91 While in Klayman v. Obama, Judge 
Leon, when turning to the efficacy of the surveillance program, questioned whether the p ogram has 
‘actually stopped an imminent attack, or otherwise aided the Government in achieving any objective that 
was time sensitive in nature, doubted that the program had significantly aided the government in 
conducting time sensitive terrorism investigations’.92 
In comparison, these en masse data collection methods undermine an individual’s privacy when they 
access personal information without his permission or knowledge. It was revealed that the purpose of the 
NSA programs is to collect as much information as possible (through surveillance programs referred to as 
Upstream, Quantuminsert, Tempora) and that by using monitoring techniques such as‘data-mining’ and 
‘dataveillance’ it is possible to determine what someone has done, are doing or will do next.93 By doing 
this, however, the intelligence services significantly violate the individual’s privacy, even if he does not 
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feel the impact directly, as he is unable to decide who has access to what information and how that 
information is being used.94 Such databases also often over-represent particular social groups, reinforcing 
distorted criminal statistics often with individuals unaware that their info mation is being used.95 Therefore 
there is a just cause for revealing the information which can then be balanced gainst the reason given of 
mission success in the proportionality calculation.  
A different key development in intelligence practices has been the use of torture – eith r directly or 
through the extraordinary rendition program – as detailed in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s 
report Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program. This 
report outlined how the CIA had developed an interrogation program, the nature of which had become 
systematically abusive, as well as acting to limit outside awareness and oversight.96 The case put forward 
for retaining the information was made by the CIA and some Republican Senators who argued that the 
release of the report would provide too many details, leading to compromised relationships with other 
governments, while in June 2013 the top intelligence official at the State Department, Philip Goldberg, 
wrote a classified letter to Congress warning against the disclosure of th names of countries who had 
participated in the program.97 In this instance the just cause for releasing the report is stronger than in the 
previous NSA case. Whereas in the NSA surveillance case there could be an argument that knowledge of 
such methods allows terrorists to circumvent their use, there is no such argument for the use of torture. 
Aside from the extraordinary levels of harm caused and the affect such practices can have on social 
cohesion, knowing that the CIA uses torture will not undermine the practice of torture itself. The efficiency 
of the program is not affected and those kidnapped through extraordinary rendition are still lik ly to be 
successfully detained. Furthermore, the use of torture is one of the most extreme fo ms of abuse and 
significantly violates both domestic and international ethical, legal and political norms. 
 
Proportionality 
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The principle of proportionality weighs up the different costs and benefits involved and outlines the course 
of action most likely to avoid the greatest harm or provide the greatest benefit. This calculation takes i to 
account the strength of the various just causes presented and balances them to see where th greatest harm 
is being caused, while also incorporating wider harms or damages. In order to make this determination 
four key questions must be answered to weigh up the forces in play. Firstly, what level of harm is caused 
if the information is released? For example, how reasonable is it to foresee that those in the field will be 
put in danger. Second, what are the benefits for keeping the secret? This is slightly different to the previous 
point in that there can indeed be positives to keeping secrets separate to the damage caused when 
information is released. For example, an important part of international intelligence cooperation is relying 
on others to keep your shared intelligence secret. Maintaining this trust and continuing such relationships 
is a positive to be included in the ethical calculation. Third, what are the harms or damages caused by 
keeping the information secret? This could include, for example, the number of specific harms caused 
when the secrecy allows for the violation of an individual’s privacy; or broader harms to society and social 
cohesion when secrecy becomes widespread or systematic. Finally, what are the benefits of relea ing the 
information? For example, can information be released to enable a crowd-sourcing respose that might aid 
the investigation; or used as an important move to ensuring and garnering trust within society. What is 
important is that the onus of the ethical calculation is towards releasing the information. Therefore, while 
wider damages can be included when assessing the need to release the information only specific goods 
directly relating to the just cause can be included when arguing for information retention.98 
In terms of operational information, the proportionality calculation balances the threat to the 
intelligence officer’s life in the in the field and the directly foreseen benefits of operational success against 
the danger caused by having the information remain secret. However, in the majority of cases the need to 
protect the agent will exceed the benefit of revealing details of a particul operation. This will therefore 
point to exactly what information can be revealed. For example, in the terrorist infiltrat on case, the 
potentially high level of harm to the operative and potentially destructive wid r backlash or undermining 
of future operations places a strong limit on any operational information being rlease. Whereas, 
infiltration of a peaceful group would mean that there is not the same potential harm if they are made aware 
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of a general operation; but to protect the operative from harm their direct parti ipation and even direct 
means used can be retained. 
In a different example the use and disclosure of communication codes is a topic that was prominently 
raised by Gordon Welchman, British mathematician and Second World War code breaker at Bletchley 
Park, who passed his final conclusions and corrections to the story of wartime code breaking for 
publication.99 In response Sir Peter Marychurch, then Director of GCHQ, chastised Welchman in a letter 
– published in The Guardian in 1985 in accordance with Welchman’s wishes – whereby Marychurch 
suggests that the information released could cause ‘direct damage to security’.100 Sir Stuart Milner-Barry 
– another codebreaker from Bletchley Park – responded to Marychurch’s criticisms by stating that this is 
a ‘prime example of the lengths to which GCHQ paranoia about the preservation of ancient secrets will 
carry them’ and that to talk of direct damage to security is ‘surely absurd’.101 This does raise an important 
tension. On the one hand the information revealed is arguably of no direct gain as it refers o technical 
details of work done. On the other hand, revealing such technical details could undermine code breaking 
at GCHQ and so there is a need for the information to be kept secret. On balance, therefore, if the question 
is whether there was a need to reveal such details then the simple answer is no, the inf rmation does not 
have to be released. Such technical information on how cryptography works does not directly impact 
individuals nor has revealing it provided any great benefit. No one’s vital interests are harmed in keeping 
them secret. There is no overall proportional gain. Nevertheless, there is a clearjust c use to keep the 
information secret in terms of classic national security concerns and the proportional losses in terms of 
others’ understanding the (even out-dated) practices of an intelligence organisations by other security 
actors.  
In terms of proportionality for strategic information, questions on what systematic damages or harms 
are being caused are important. For example, the growth of a torture culture brings an additional harms in
the form of the normalisation of such activities along with wider social harms. Richard Matthews argues 
that no individual is an island, but is a part of a complex set of social networks that are also damaged when 
someone is tortured: ‘In torturing one person, torturers also harm these networks… Torture never merely 
attacks a single “terrorist”; its run-on effect is well documented and involves wide-ranging pain and 
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suffering across the communities and contexts from which the torture victim comes’.102 Additional costs 
can therefore include, ‘loss of international stature and credibility, and the risk of retaliation against 
soldiers and civilians’, significantly affecting the United States’ role in world politics, promoting 
retaliation overseas and hindering foreign policy operations.103 While it might be argued that releasing the 
information can heighten social tension and even promote radicalisation, the counter is that if such 
practices are causing discontent amongst certain social groups, it is only by being made publicly 
accountable for their actions that the potential radicalisation of individuals can be successfully dealt 




The basic idea of discrimination is that there is a distinction between two groups of people, legitimate and 
illegitimate, to which different rights, duties and expectations are bestowed, affecting how the state should 
treat them. For secret keeping the principle of discrimination sets out that there can be different ways and 
degrees to inform different groups of people depending on who they are and what they have done. That is, 
depending on how the information relates or impacts an individual there are different claims as to whether 
they are to be informed or not. The argument is that information about the individual can be considered 
their personal property and so they can make claims to control who has access to it. If the secret information 
is about them or is created by their actions then they have a right to know who is acces ing, storing or 
using it.105 Also, if the information – the collection, retention or use of – will affect someone detrimentally 
then they have a right to know in order to make fully rational decisions about how then to act. Similar to 
the right to know if you are living in the vicinity of a hazardous chemical factory or the potential dangers 
of medicine before taking it, in order to be fully autonomous individuals must be able to have enough 
information in order to make a rational choice. This right to know, however, can be qualified by the 
individual waiving their claim to the information through some (in)activity or circumstance. For example, 
by becoming a threat individuals can waive some of their protective rights in the process and so can have 
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their information retained. Or, if the repercussions of releasing the informati n are likely to negatively 
affect another then the negative effects can be balanced between those involved.  
In terms of who should be informed on what operational details the fall of the East German Stasi 
is an interesting case in point. The Stasi held extensive archives on individuals and with their fall the newly 
united German authorities made an effort to allow individuals to request access to information if it is related 
to them. This offered the individual a halfway house as a clear mandate of openness was set down with 
established processes for requesting and gaining access to the information. However, the effort remained 
with the individual to request the information, representing the best of a passive machine. FoI requests 
offer neither the openness mandate nor would individuals be aware that they were involved and so would 
not think to ask. Resolving these problems, therefore, must start with a form o  authority that actively 
(when the time and situation is right according to the other criteria) loc tes individuals involved and 
informs them if any of their information was collected, if they were targeted or involved in some way, and 
why. 
For operational information is that for those individuals who are directly involved, while they 
might not know about operational details they do have a right to know how they wer  involved, what 
information was collected on them and to have that information destroyed if they wish. Given that the 
emphasis is on the need to reveal unless there is a strong reason not to, the agency must approach the 
individual rather than waiting for them to make an appeal of some form. For strategic information on 
policies such as the surveillance program, given that the collection detrimentally effects the whole of 
society there is a cause for wide disclosure. The indiscriminate nature means large portions of society are 
affected. Indeed, the subsequent backlash from both the public and political elite demonstrates that there 
is a disconnect between what was thought to be occurring and the intelligence practiced. Elected 
representatives in both the United Kingdom and the United States have since complained that they ve 
insufficient information to adequately oversee the work of intelligence agencies, or are barred from 
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Conclusion 
The argument is that democracies are unable to keep suitable control over their intelligence community 
because an inherent incompatibility of mentality and organisational structure. On the side of the overseers, 
systems that fundamentally rely on public pressures as both their place from where they draw their core 
value of sovereign legitimacy as well as a practical means of ensuring correct activity, the extending circle 
of secrecy has corroded their very purpose and function of these oversight actors. While on the intelligence 
side, this is a field that comes with it an inherent security pressures that have created a culture that raises 
itself above the ordinary domestic concerns. Such a privileged position distorts the view of not only those 
on the inside of the organisation so that their decisions become escalated, but also that of their overseers 
who have given deference to the executive wing and are reluctant to restrict any are  which comes with 
the perceived fear of limiting national security. Therefore, the proposed new systm comes with the benefit 
of being already well-versed in tackling ethical dilemmas that are faced at the level of national security. 
By examining the different forms of intelligence information it is clear th t there is no single answer for 
when secrets should be kept or released. Rather, that a more nuanced balanced between the different forces 
is required, taking into account both the harm and benefit that secrecy can bring. What is difficult is how 
to ensure and reassure that this balance is maintained when people cannot see it. Therefore t r  should be 
a strong assumption that the information be released and that in instances where it is to be retained an 
explicit case should be presented as for why. This means using the principles outlined to stress the need 
for a new way to think about how secrets are seen in society and what the short comings of the existing 
system are. There needs to be a proactive, robust and politically neutral organisation that is not subjected 
to political whim or influence. The just war tradition offers a set of ethical principles that should guide the 
development of any oversight structure by providing some key critical questions that must be asked: is the 
legitimate authority truly able to act without bias and in the best interes s of the whole political community, 
and how should the structure be designed in order to limit the inherent biases and political warfare found 
within the system; is the emphasis on where the secrecy line must rest in the correct place, erring on the 
side of revealing information and forcing the intelligence community to work up a steep slope to justify 
their need for secrecy; what is the underlying argument for the secrecy and does it take a wider view of 
security of the whole political community over that of a narrow national security understanding; what are 
the overall harms caused by wide reaching policies and practices; and are those individuals within the 
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community who are affected given notice of the impact on their lives and the opportunity to i quire about 
their involvement. Only by replacing the emphasis in this way and establishing more explicit criteria can 
the trust that has recently been lost begin to be rebuilt. 
